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We consider the role of a politician’s age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not
binding, younger mayors engage in political budget cycles more often than older mayors. Thus younger
politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to
have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative
interpretations.
INTRODUCTION
When discussing whom to vote for, citizens commonly mention the age of the candidate,
saying that he or she is too young (too inexperienced or too aggressive and eager) or too
old (unmotivated, not energetic enough). In fact, concerns over a politician’s age often
extend beyond the casual worries of voters, and there are many examples of laws that
limit the eligibility of candidates based on their age. Some of these laws date back at least
two thousand years: the lex Villia annalis, established in Rome in 180 BC, set minimum
ages for senatorial magistrates.1 This law was approved shortly after Publius Cornelius
Scipio Africanus moved swiftly through the cursus honorum (the levels of the political
career in ancient Rome) and became consul at the age of 30. The main rationale for the
law was that the established elite believed that the policy choices made by young political
leaders were driven too much by personal ambition (‘career concerns’ in modern
terminology) and the desire to emulate Scipio’s example (Kuiper 2010).2 Today many
countries—including Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Italy,
Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, the USA and Venezuela—impose age restrictions for
holding public office. The age threshold is often greater than the minimum age to vote,
and can be as high as 40 (Hong Kong, Italy and Nigeria) or 45 (the Philippines). Another
issue that might become relevant in the policy debate is whether politicians should have a
retirement age. A prominent Indian congressman has advocated for a retirement age for
politicians on the grounds that the politicians in office are often older than the voters they
represent (Pilot 2004).
Policies that place age restrictions on politicians and the concern of voters must be
based on the view that the age of a policymaker matters for public policy. However, to
the best of our knowledge, the effect of a politician’s age on policy has been largely
neglected by the literature. The exceptions are Altindag and Mocan (2015), who find,
among members of the Turkish Parliament, a negative correlation between a politician’s
age and the probability of strategically switching parties when facing electoral
uncertainty. While suggestive, the latter result does not imply that age causally affects
public policies, because many omitted geographic variables are correlated with the age of
the elected politicians. Additionally, Bertrand et al. (2015) study the effects of a
bureaucrat’s age in India. Younger entrants in the Administrative Service display
stronger career concerns, even though, unlike politicians, their careers are decided by
their superiors, not voters. Previous research has examined the effects of other politician
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characteristics on policy. For instance, gender (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004;
Gagliarducci and Paserman 2012; Brollo and Troiano 2016), religion (Meyersson 2014),
tenure (Coviello and Gagliarducci 2017), salary (Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013),
education (Besley et al. 2011) and race (Vogl 2014) have all been shown to matter in a
variety of ways for policies. In this paper we focus on age.
Younger politicians may differ from older ones for at least five reasons. One is that
they have a potentially longer political career ahead of them and therefore have stronger
career concerns. The second is simply that, as younger citizens, they have a longer
horizon and therefore they may have an incentive to adopt more long-term policies.3 The
third and more mundane reason is that younger politicians may be more energetic and
productive at work. The fourth reason is that there could be different self-selection
patterns by age: because people of different ages have different opportunities in the
labour market, this may affect the decision to become a politician. The fifth reason is that
politicians of different ages may have different political connections—innate or
accumulated doing the course of their previous work.
We use data on Italian municipalities that are in charge of a vast array of public
goods, such as education, transportation and waste management. On the revenue side,
Italian mayors have the power to propose changes in property tax rates and municipal
income tax rates.4
The age of a mayor may be correlated with many city and individual characteristics.
For instance, cities with more favourable attitudes towards young people may be more
likely to have young mayors and would likely have different policy preferences. In order
to identify our effect, we use a fixed-effects model to control for time-invariant municipal
characteristics. The effect of age is identified by using changes in the mayor’s age across
mayoral terms within a municipality. Furthermore, we account for time-varying
municipal confounders by focusing on mayoral terms following close elections.
We first find that younger mayors are more likely to be re-elected and are also more
likely to move to higher levels of elected government, both provincial and regional. We
verify that the re-election effect is not merely explained by the fact that younger mayors
are also more likely to run again. If we take re-election as a proxy of good government,
then these results may be consistent with the view that younger politicians implement
better policies. Perhaps younger politicians implement policies of higher quality because
they are better selected or exert more effort, and this is why they are more often re-
elected. Measuring the quality of public policies is difficult, and we cannot decisively
reject these hypotheses. However, capitalization models imply that better policies or
better governors should be incorporated into house prices (Oates 1969; Yinger 1982).
With this in mind, we test whether the age of the mayor affects house prices. We find no
effect. A second possibility is that younger mayors may respond more quickly to the
needs of their constituents. To test this hypothesis, we check whether the mayor’s age
affects the speed of public good provision.5 We find that younger mayors are not faster in
actually providing to voters the public goods that were budgeted at the beginning of the
year, suggesting that this channel is unlikely to explain why younger mayors are more
likely to get re-elected.
In the second part of the paper, we examine the mayor’s policies implemented while
in office. Younger and older mayors choose similar levels of expenditure and revenue on
average during the term. However, the timing of expenditure differs by age: younger
mayors are more likely to increase capital expenditure right before an upcoming election.
The fact that budget cycles occur on capital expenditure is consistent with the result of
Cioffi et al. (2012), who argue that capital expenditure is highly visible and easily targeted
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to specific groups of voters.6 Alesina and Paradisi (2017) provide evidence of political
budget cycles on real estate taxes in Italian cities. Other papers dealing with cycles in
Italian municipalities include Bartolini and Santolini (2009) and Bonfatti and Forni
(2017). Surveys of the literature on political cycles include Alesina et al. (1997), Drazen
(2000), Cioffi et al. (2012) and Alesina and Passalacqua (2017).7 This literature shows
that political budget cycles occur in some circumstances and not in others. In this context
we make the novel point that political budget cycles are more likely to occur when the
career concerns of politicians are stronger.
Do younger mayors have a higher probability of re-election because they strategically
increase spending right before the election, thus fooling voters? We do find a positive
correlation between the cycle in capital expenditure and re-election. This correlation is
nearly significant at the 10% level when mayor controls and city and election-year effects
are excluded; however, the estimate becomes less precise when either mayor controls or
city and election-year effects are added to the regression, even if the size of the coefficient
remains virtually unchanged. Thus these results are only suggestive.
Song et al. (2012) predict that the age of voters may matter for fiscal policy: young
voters may have a disciplining effect on the implemented fiscal policy, because old voters
do not internalize the future costs of a present loose fiscal policy. Thus, reading our
results in light of theirs, young politicians would like to engage in short-term fiscal
policies to be re-elected, while young voters would want to discipline them, which is an
interesting contrast. As a young citizen, a young politician to some extent would prefer
long-term, non-strategic policies. As an ambitious politician, he might prefer the
opposite. Our results show that for the average young politician, the second effect
dominates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our data and the institutional
setting. Section II describes our methodology. Section III presents our results, and
Section IV concludes.
I. DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Institutional information
The Italian municipal government (comune) is composed of a mayor (sindaco), an
executive committee (giunta) appointed by the mayor, and an elected city council
(consiglio comunale) responsible for authorizing the annual budget proposed by the
mayor. The mayor and the executive committee propose policies, such as changes in the
tax rates or expenditure. Subsequently, the city council votes on the proposals.
Municipalities manage around 10% of total public expenditure in Italy and are in charge
of many public services, such as preschools, waste management, municipal roads and
municipal public housing. Expenditures are divided into two types: capital expenditure,
which relates to multi-year production factors, where amortization does take place, and
current expenditure, which relates to only the current fiscal year.
In 1993, a law changed the mayoral electoral rule from party to individual ballot and
introduced a two-term limit. In 2000, the duration of the mayoral term was extended
from four to five years. Municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants adopt a runoff
system to elect mayors, while a single-round system is in place in cities with a population
below this threshold.8 The number of city councillors depends on the size of the
municipality.9 We calculate the margin of victory for municipalities with runoff as the
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margin of victory in the second election, while we use the margin of victory of the first
(and only) election for the other municipalities.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our main database includes administrative data on municipal elections and politicians
from 1998 to 2014, provided by the Italian Ministry of the Interior (Ministero
dell’Interni). The data contain information on every municipal election and every
appointed administrator in the municipal, provincial, regional and national
administrations. For every election, we have data on the number of candidates, and on
the vote, party affiliation and demographic information of each candidate who is
appointed to any position in the administration. We complement this dataset with
socioeconomic and demographic information on Italian municipalities from the Italian
National Institute of Statistics (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) and administrative data
on financial reports from the Italian Ministry of the Interior covering the years 1998–
2013. The financial reports data contain yearly information on revenues and
expenditures. We also obtained access to administrative data on house prices from the
Italian Land Registry Agency (Agenzia del Territorio) for the years 2002–11.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample: mayor characteristics,
municipality characteristics, political outcomes, public good and housing outcomes, and
budget outcomes. We include in the sample all observations with non-missing data on the
vote counts and ages of first- and second-place mayoral candidates. This creates a sample
of around 23,000 mayoral terms, 16,000 of which have data on public finance
outcomes.10 In order to limit the potential impact of outliers, we winsorize the public
finance variables at the 99% and 1% levels. The results are very similar without
winsorizing those variables.
As shown in Table 1, the older candidate wins the election in around 50% of the
cases. On average, Italian mayors are 49 years old and have 6.4 years of experience in
elected municipal office and 0.8 years of experience in unelected municipal office at the
time of election. Roughly 11% of mayors are women, and on average the mayor faces
two rivals on the electoral ballot. 55% of the municipalities that we consider are in the
north, 31% are in the south, and 15% are in the centre. Among all non-term-limited
mayors, 45% ran for re-election, and 35% were re-elected to a second term, where the
latter number refers to all non-term-limited mayors, not just those who ran for re-
election. 8% of mayors were elected to the provincial administration within 10 years of
their first election to the mayor office, 1% of mayors were later elected to a position in the
regional administration, and 1% of mayors were later elected to a position in the
national administration.
The age of a mayor may be correlated with many city and individual characteristics.
For instance, cities with more favourable attitudes toward young people may be more
likely to have young mayors and would likely have different policy preferences. In order
to identify our effect, we use a fixed-effects model to control for time-invariant municipal
characteristics. The effect of age is identified by using changes in the mayor’s age across
mayoral terms within a municipality.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Simply comparing the outcomes of municipalities governed by mayors of different ages
would not allow us to identify our effect of interest, because many other variables, not
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only observable but also unobservable, are correlated with the age of the mayor. The
summary statistics provided in Table 2 show that many individual and municipality
characteristics differ according to whether the older or younger mayoral candidate won
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Mean S.D. Min Max Obs.
Mayor
Older candidate won 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 22,789
Older candidate’s margin of victory 0.28 28.01 98.66 98.08 22,789
Age 49.12 9.93 18.64 86.31 22,789
Previously held any city office 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 22,789
City political experience (elected) 6.40 5.24 0.00 24.00 22,789
City political experience (unelected) 0.78 2.00 0.00 16.00 22,789
Woman 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 22,789
Born locally 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 22,789
High school degree 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 22,789
College degree 0.45 0.49 0.00 1.00 22,789
Centre-right party 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 22,789
Number of rivals on ballot 1.87 1.25 1.00 18.00 22,789
Term limit binding 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 22,789
Municipality
Population (2001) 7481.38 43,095.43 33.00 2,546,804.00 22,789
Population per square km (2005) 309.41 656.51 1.00 12,624.00 22,789
Active pop./total pop. (2005) 0.41 0.06 0.16 0.60 22,789
Elderly index (2005) 1.89 1.53 0.00 35.00 22,789
Family size (2005) 2.46 0.31 1.20 4.20 22,789
Production units per capita (2005) 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.34 22,789
Employed/total pop. (2005) 0.26 0.18 0.02 3.03 22,789
Income per capita (2005 €) 13,506.76 3,056.29 5,013.00 44,949.00 22,789
Altitude (metres) 488.15 434.27 0.00 2,851.00 22,789
North 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 22,789
Central 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 22,789
South 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 22,789
Political outcomes
Ran for re-election (not term-limited) 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 14,894
Re-elected (not term-limited) 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 14,894
Provincial administration after term 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 22,789
Regional administration after term 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 22,789
National administration after term 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 22,789
Public good and housing outcomes
Speed of public good provision 0.77 0.07 0.56 0.90 15,937
Average house price 848.10 456.90 182.71 8893.75 9000
Budget outcomes
Revenue per capita 719.72 503.87 180.11 3449.92 127,171
Capital expenditure per capita 78.03 152.93 0.00 1046.25 127,525
Current expenditure per capita 539.04 269.68 246.90 1914.84 127,521
Notes See Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. The outcomes ‘Ran for
re-election’ and ‘Re-election’ are set to missing for mayoral terms in which the incumbent faces a binding term
limit. Budget outcomes are yearly, while the other outcomes are measured on the basis of mayoral terms.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY WINNING CANDIDATE
Mean by winning
candidate
Older Younger Difference p-value Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mayor
Age 54.31 44.17 10.14*** 0.000 22,789
Previously held any city office 0.80 0.79 0.02*** 0.004 22,789
City political experience (elected) 6.84 5.98 0.86*** 0.000 22,789
City political experience (unelected) 0.73 0.82 0.09*** 0.001 22,789
Woman 0.09 0.12 0.03*** 0.000 22,789
Born locally 0.54 0.40 0.14*** 0.000 22,789
High school degree 0.86 0.92 0.06*** 0.000 22,789
College degree 0.41 0.48 0.08*** 0.000 22,789
Centre-right party 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.454 22,789
Number of rivals on ballot 1.86 1.89 0.03* 0.052 22,789
Term limit binding 0.37 0.32 0.05*** 0.000 22,789
Municipality
Population (2001) 7012.05 7929.88 917.83 0.108 22,789
Population per square km (2005) 307.43 311.31 3.88 0.656 22,789
Active pop./total pop. (2005) 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.864 22,789
Elderly index (2005) 1.90 1.89 0.00 0.907 22,789
Family size (2005) 2.46 2.46 0.00 0.997 22,789
Production units per capita (2005) 0.08 0.08 0.00*** 0.001 22,789
Employed/total pop. (2005) 0.26 0.27 0.00** 0.036 22,789
Income per capita (2005 €) 13,447.81 13,563.09 115.28*** 0.004 22,789
Altitude (metres) 486.73 489.50 2.77 0.631 22,789
North 0.55 0.54 0.01 0.333 22,789
Central 0.14 0.16 0.02*** 0.001 22,789
South 0.31 0.30 0.01 0.156 22,789
Political outcomes
Ran for re-election (not term-limited) 0.41 0.48 0.07*** 0.000 14,894
Re-elected (not term-limited) 0.30 0.39 0.09*** 0.000 14,894
Provincial administration after term 0.07 0.10 0.03*** 0.000 22,789
Regional administration after term 0.01 0.02 0.00*** 0.004 22,789
National administration after term 0.01 0.01 0.00** 0.010 22,789
Public good and housing outcomes
Speed of public good provision 0.77 0.77 0.00 0.145 15,937
Average house price 841.22 872.11 30.89*** 0.002 8170
Budget outcomes
Revenue per capita 675.82 683.06 7.24*** 0.008 110,183
Capital expenditure per capita 65.36 65.74 0.38 0.634 110,417
Current expenditure per capita 516.04 518.60 2.57* 0.086 110,413
Notes See Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) report averages in years following the victory of the older and younger
mayoral candidate, respectively. Column (3) reports the difference of the averages, column (4) reports the p-
value corresponding to the two-sided test of equality of the averages, and column (5) reports the sample size. *,
**, *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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the last election. For instance, older mayors have more elected political experience, less
unelected political experience, and less education. Older mayors are also less likely to be
women, more likely to have been born locally, and more likely to govern a lower-income
municipality. Therefore we pursue a fixed-effects strategy to alleviate the aforementioned
concerns, and we explain why a regression discontinuity strategy is inappropriate in our
setting.
Fixed-effects model
We begin our analysis by using the model
Ymt ¼ bAgemt þ d0Zmt þ gm þ ct þ emt;ð1Þ
where Y is an outcome, Age is the age of the mayor as of the date of the most recent
election, and Z is a vector of mayor characteristics. The letter m indexes municipalities,
and t indexes election years. The parameters gm and ct represent municipality fixed effects
and election-year effects. The outcome Ymt is measured over the term in office of the
winner in municipality m and election year t.
The effect of age is identified using within-municipality variation in the mayor’s age
across mayoral terms. Our identifying assumption is that the mayor’s age is exogenous to
the time-varying municipality and mayor unobservables, ɛmt. This assumption will hold if
Zmt contains all outcome-relevant mayor characteristics correlated with age, and the
municipality and election-year fixed effects absorb all unobserved municipal and
temporal heterogeneity that is correlated with both outcomes and the age of the mayor.
If the identification assumptions are satisfied, then b represents the expected change in Y
from increasing the mayor’s age by one year, holding the controls constant.
The main threat to our identifying assumption is that changes in voter preferences for
public goods may be correlated with changes in the mayor’s age. We address this
possibility by also reporting results for the subsample of mayoral terms following
elections determined by a vote margin of 5 percentage points or less. By focusing on
outcomes following close elections, we isolate changes in the mayor’s age due to
idiosyncratic electoral outcomes rather than changes in voter preferences.
Equation (1) assumes a linear relationship between mayor age and outcomes. To test




bk1ðAgemt 2 BinkÞ þ d0Zmt þ gm þ ct þ emt:ð2Þ
Each age bin is five years long, with the exception of the (omitted) reference age bin (18–
30 years) and the final bin (66+ years), both of which are aggregated to avoid very small
bin sizes.
Another important parametric assumption of equation (1) is that the non-age
characteristics enter the equation in a linear fashion. In Tables A14–A17 of the
Appendix, we relax this assumption by using propensity-score-matching and inverse-
probability-weighting estimators. To implement these estimators, we specify treatment
assignment as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the older candidate won the election, and
the propensity score as a logistic function of Z. The estimators condition on individual
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covariates without requiring a linear relationship between Z and the outcomes. The
results using these estimators are very similar to the baseline results.
Dynamic panel model
To examine how political budget cycles vary according to the age of the mayor, we










qkYm;tk þ d1Elecm;t þ d2Agem;t þ d3Elecm;t  Agem;t þ gm þ ft þ mm;t;
ð4Þ
wherem indexes municipalities, and t indexes calendar years. The variable Ym,t represents
a fiscal outcome, such as capital expenditure. The variable Elecm,t equals 1 when t is the
year prior to an election in municipality m, and 0 otherwise. The variable Oldm,t equals 1
if the mayor of municipality m in year t was the older of the top two candidates in the
most recent election, and 0 otherwise. The variable Agem,t is the age of the current mayor
as of the date of the most recent election.
The model includes K lagged values of Y to capture the persistence of fiscal outcomes.
We report results for K = 1 to maximize sample size; however, the estimates are very
similar in magnitude and significance when K = 2 or K = 3. The model also includes
municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects. We measure political budget cycles as the
difference in fiscal outcomes in the year prior to an election compared to all other years of
the mayor’s term. The model allows both the level of spending and the size of the political
budget cycle to vary according to the mayor’s age. In equation (3), b1 captures the
political budget cycle under younger mayors, and b1+b3 captures the political budget
cycle under older mayors. Therefore b3 captures the difference in political budget cycles
under older and younger mayors. In equation (4), d1+d3Age captures the political budget
cycle under a mayor of age Age. Therefore d3 represents the marginal effect on the
political budget cycle of increasing the mayor’s age by one year.
There are two reasons why standard fixed-effects estimators (i.e. ‘within’ estimators) of
equations (3) and (4) would be asymptotically biased. The first is the well-known Nickell
(1981) bias due to the presence of lagged dependent variables. This bias is likely to be
substantial, given that we have a short panel. To address this issue, we estimate equations
(3) and (4) using system GMM, which exploits moment conditions for the equations, in
both first differences and levels, identified by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and
Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998).11 Because instrument proliferation can result
from exploiting all moment conditions in system GMM, we follow the guidelines of
Roodman (2009) and Bazzi and Clemens (2013) to avoid the problem of many weak
instruments. Specifically, we ‘collapse’ the instrument matrix and use only twice-lagged
instruments for y and contemporaneous instruments for the other variables.
Economica
© 2018 The London School of Economics and Political Science
696 ECONOMICA [OCTOBER
The second potential source of bias is the mayor’s age. In the full sample of
municipalities, both Old and Age could be endogenous in the above equations, even after
accounting for municipality fixed effects. The reason is that changes in voter preferences
for spending could be correlated with either changes in the electoral performance of older
or younger candidates—rendering both Old and Age endogenous—or changes in the age
profile of the pool of candidates—rendering Age endogenous. We address this possibility
by limiting the sample to municipality–years following a close election, where a ‘close’
election is decided by a vote margin of 5 percentage points or fewer.12 We thus focus on
time variation in Old and Age driven by arguably idiosyncratic election outcomes rather
than shifts in voter preferences. We estimate equation (4) in two ways. The first treats
Age and its interaction as strictly exogenous (conditional on the aforementioned sample
selection), and the second treats Age and its interaction as endogenous and uses Old and
its interaction as instruments.
Because the incentive to manipulate fiscal outcomes for electoral advantage differs
depending on whether the mayor’s term limit is binding, we present results separately for
mayoral terms when the term limit was binding and those when it was not. In the
Appendix we discuss why a regression discontinuity design would not be fully
appropriate in our context.
Equation (4) assumes a linear relationship between the mayor’s age and the size of
the political budget cycle. To test whether this is a good approximation, we also estimate
the flexible equation







dkElecm;t  1ðAgem;t 2 BinkÞ þ gm þ ft þ mm;t;
ð5Þ
which uses the same age bins as in equation (2).
III. RESULTS
The effect of age on re-election
First we estimate the effect of the mayor’s age on reappointment. We limit the sample to
elections in which the incumbent mayor does not face a binding term limit. In Table 3 we
present estimates of the coefficient on age in the fixed-effects model, both with and without
controls for prior appointment to city office, elected city political experience, unelected city
political experience, gender, high school education, college education, and whether the
mayor was born in the city that he or she governs. The results in panel A are based on the
full sample of mayoral terms, and the results in panel B are based on mayoral terms
following close elections. In the full sample of mayoral terms, a one-year increase in age
reduces the mayor’s probability of running again for mayor by 0.65 percentage points, and
reduces the probability of re-election to another mayoral term by 0.71 percentage points.
This means that a one-standard-deviation increase in the mayor’s age (10 years) reduces
the probability of running again by 14%, and reduces the probability of re-election by
20% relative to their respective means. We also find that a one-year increase in age reduces
the probability of being appointed in the provincial administration (within five years after
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the end of the political term) by about 0.17 percentage points, and reduces the probability
of being appointed in the regional administration by about 0.02 percentage points. This
means that a one-standard-deviation increase in the mayor’s age reduces the probabilities
of joining the provincial and regional administrations by 21% and 20% relative to their
respective means. The effect of the mayor’s age on reaching the national administration is
small and statistically insignificant. In the sample of mayoral terms following close
elections, the effect of age on running again and re-election is larger in absolute magnitude
than the baseline estimates, and the effect of age on reaching higher levels of government is
similar to the baseline estimates. Overall, the estimates seem not to be sensitive to the
inclusion of controls for other mayor characteristics. Note that for the latter four
outcomes we do not condition on the mayor’s decision to run again, which is endogenous.
Is the lower re-election rate for older mayors entirely explained by the fact that older
mayors are less likely to run for re-election? We use the dichotomous age measure, Old,
which indicates whether the older candidate won the election. Table A14 in the
Appendix shows that the probability of running for re-election is 9.1 percentage points
lower for the older candidate, and the probability of being re-elected is 13.6 percentage
points lower for the older candidate. The results imply that a share of the re-election effect
can be explained by the (endogenous) decision to run again. Since the choice to run for re-
election is endogenous and depends on the expected probability of winning, the causal effect
of age on re-election conditional on running again is not easily recovered. If all mayors
faced the same probability of re-election conditional on running again, which at the sample
mean is 78% (the re-election rate 0.35 divided by the rate of running again 0.45), then the
effect of age on running again would result in older mayors having a 7-percentage-point
lower re-election probability compared to younger mayors. In fact, older mayors have a re-
election probability that is 13.6 percentage points lower than that of younger mayors. Thus
the effect of age on running again by itself explains roughly half of the estimated re-election
effect. The second panel of Table A14 shows that the difference between the re-election
effect and the effect on running again is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The baseline regression specifies a linear relationship between mayor age and
outcomes. Is this a good approximation? Figure 1 plots point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals for the coefficients bk in equation (2), where b‘ represents the
difference between average outcomes for mayors in bin ‘ and mayors in the 18–30 year
bin, accounting for individual controls, municipality fixed effects and election-year
effects. The effect of age on the probability of running again, being re-elected, and
moving to the provincial administration, appears quite linear. The results for moving to
the regional administration appear less linear, though the estimates are noisy due to the
fact that this is a very rare event.
In Table 4 we report the effect of age on moving to higher office for term-limited
mayors. We report results only for the full sample of second-term mayors, as there is not
sufficient variation in the outcomes in the subsample of second terms following close
elections. The full sample results show that age continues to have a negative effect on
reaching higher office, though the results are more statistically significant and larger in
absolute magnitude than the baseline results using first-term mayors.
The effect of age on average revenue and expenditure
Now we explore why younger candidates tend to be elected by looking at what they do
when they are in office. We first examine the effect of the mayor’s age on average revenue
and expenditure over the term, both measured in euros per capita.
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31–35 41–45 51–55 61–65 66+
Age Bin
Regional administration
FIGURE 1. Mayor age and political outcomes. Notes: This figure plots point estimates and 95% confidence
intervals for the coefficients bk in the regression Ymt ¼
P8
k¼1 bk1ðAgemt 2 BinkÞ þ d0Zmt þ gm þ ct þ emt. The
(omitted) reference age category is 18–30. Each included age bin is five years long, with the exception of the
final bin, which is aggregated to avoid very small bin sizes. The vector Z contains controls for prior
appointment to city office, elected city political experience, unelected city political experience, gender, high
school education, college education, and whether the mayor was born in the city that he or she governs.
TABLE 4
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON POLITICAL OUTCOMES (BINDING TERM LIMIT,
FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES)
Provincial admin. Regional admin. National admin.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.0044*** 0.0046*** 0.0009*** 0.0011*** 0.0005** 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 5533 5533 5533 5533 5533 5533
Observations 7892 7892 7892 7892 7892 7892
Notes See Table 3.
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Panel A of Table 5 shows estimates of the coefficient on age in the fixed-effects model,
both with and without controls for mayor characteristics, using the full sample of
mayoral terms. Panel B shows the corresponding estimates based on the subsample of
terms following close elections. Of the 12 point estimates presented in the table, none is
significant at the 10% level. The magnitudes of the estimates are economically small.
There is no evidence that the age of the mayor matters for revenue or expenditure, on
average.
Figure 2 presents the estimates of equation (2) for the average public finance
outcomes. According to the first two graphs, mayors in the age range of 18–30 have
higher average revenue and average capital expenditure than mayors in the other age
bins. Beyond the 30-year mark, however, the effect of age on these two outcomes is
roughly zero—hence linear—across the age distribution. Thus for average revenue and
average capital expenditure, the effect of age is non-linear only in the age range 18–35.
For these outcomes, we view the linear specification as an approximation. The third
graph shows that the effect of age on average current expenditure is roughly zero across
the entire age distribution. The results are very similar when we remove municipality-
specific linear trends from the revenue and expenditure outcomes. (See Table A5 in the
Appendix for details.)
The effect of age on measures of quality of governance
A career-concerns model, in which politicians care about both citizen welfare and re-
election, and have heterogeneous values of re-election, would predict that younger
politicians value re-election more. In this subsection we test whether the quality of their
policies is superior because they invest more effort.13 Younger mayors may improve their
chances at re-election by means of a variety of policies and their quality, which we may
not observe in our dataset.
TABLE 5
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON AVERAGE BUDGET OUTCOMES
Average revenue Average capital expend.
Average current
expend.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Fixed-effects estimates
Age 0.10 0.23 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.22
(0.38) (0.41) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 6584 6584 6584 6584 6584 6584
Observations 10,244 10,244 10,244 10,244 10,244 10,244
Panel B: Fixed-effects estimates, close elections
Age 0.65 0.94 0.22 0.20 0.36 0.35
(0.92) (1.05) (0.35) (0.42) (0.37) (0.44)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902
Observations 2122 2122 2122 2122 2122 2122
Notes See Table 3.
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If the capitalization model is correct (Oates 1969; Yinger 1982), then one would
expect that better policies translate into higher house prices. As shown in Table 6, there is
little evidence that house prices respond to the age of the mayor in office. While the
mayor’s age has a statistically significant, negative effect on house prices in the
specification without controls using the subsample of terms following a close election,
adding controls results in a dramatically reduced point estimate that becomes statistically
insignificant. The results are very similar when we remove municipality-specific linear
trends from the outcome. (See Table A6 in the Appendix for details.)
A second interpretation is that while younger and older mayors implement similar
policies, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the younger ones are faster in responding
to citizens’ needs. For instance, Casaburi and Troiano (2015) find that the returns to
otherwise identical tax enforcement policies are stronger for mayors who are faster in
translating these policies to actual public goods. To investigate this possibility, we adopt
the same measure of speed of public good provision adopted in Casaburi and Troiano
(2015), and test whether this measure responds to the age of the mayor. The measure is
the ratio of actually provided public goods over the public goods that were promised to
voters in the provisional budget at the end of the year. The estimates in Table 6 indicate






























31–35 41–45 51–55 61–65 66+
Age Bin
Average current expenditure
FIGURE 2. Mayor age and average public finance outcomes.Notes: See Figure 1.
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results are very similar when we remove municipality-specific linear trends from the
outcome. (See Table A6 in the Appendix for details.)
Figure 3 displays the estimates of equation (2) for the speed of public good provision

















31–35 41–45 51–55 61–65 66+
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31–35 41–45 51–55 61–65 66+
Age Bin
Average house price
FIGURE 3. Mayor age and other municipal outcomes.Notes: See Figure 1.
TABLE 6
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON HOUSE PRICES AND THE SPEED OF PUBLIC GOOD
PROVISION
Average house price Speed of public good provision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Fixed-effects estimates
Age 0.19 0.20 0.000035 0.000041
(0.18) (0.19) (0.000082) (0.000078)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 5232 5232 6581 6581
Observations 5995 5995 10,239 10,239
Panel B: Fixed-effects estimates, close elections
Age 0.71 0.23 0.000099 0.00026
(0.44) (0.49) (0.00052) (0.00032)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 1173 1173 1902 1902
Observations 1228 1228 2123 2123
Notes See Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. In all specifications, the
sample is restricted to mayoral terms in which the term limit is not binding. Results are reported with and
without controls for prior appointment to city office, elected city political experience, unelected city political
experience, gender, high school education, college education, and whether the mayor was born in the city that
he or she governs. Standard errors in the fixed-effects specification are robust to heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the level of municipality. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.10,
p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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Age and political budget cycles
Political budget cycles lower the welfare of citizens by distorting the path of fiscal policy.
However, for younger politicians this social cost could be outweighed by the benefit of
increasing the re-election probability, because younger politicians expect to have a long
political career. If voters are gullible or rational but poorly informed about the negative
consequences of budget cycles, this would in turn imply that younger voters have a
higher re-election probability. We therefore test whether the mayor’s age affects the
timing of revenue and expenditure relative to the electoral cycle.
We do this by estimating equations (3) and (4) using system GMM. For the sake of
brevity, we report estimates only for specifications that exclude controls for mayor
characteristics. The results (available on request) are very similar when we add these
controls.
Panel A in Table 7 presents the results for the full sample of mayoral terms, while
panel B presents the results for terms following close elections. Columns (1), (4) and (7)
present estimates of equation (3). Columns (2), (5) and (8) present estimates of
equation (4), treating Age and its interaction as strictly exogenous, while in columns
(3), (6) and (9), Age and its interaction are treated as endogenous and instrumented
with Old and its interaction. Column (1) of panel A shows that younger mayors
increase revenue by 12.54 euros per capita in the year before an election relative to
other years of the mayoral term. This effect is significant at the 5% level. In contrast,
older mayors increase revenue by only 5.41 euros per capita in the year before an
election; however, the difference in revenue cycles for older and younger mayors is
statistically insignificant. Similarly, the results in columns (2) and (3), which model a
linear relationship between the mayor’s age and the size of the budget cycle, show that
revenue cycles are smaller for older mayors, but the marginal effect of age is
statistically insignificant. The results in panel B based on terms following close
elections confirm the conclusion that the mayor’s age does not have a statistically
significant effect on cycles in total revenue.
The specification in column (4) of Table 7 tests whether political budget cycles in
capital expenditure are different for older and younger mayors. In the sample of all
mayoral terms (panel A), younger mayors increase capital expenditure by 7.25 euros per
capita in the year before the election, and in the sample of terms following close elections
(panel B), younger mayors increase capital expenditure by 9.48 euros per capita. These
two estimates are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The corresponding
estimates of capital expenditure cycles for older mayors, on the other hand, are very close
to zero—28 cents per capita and 55 cents per capita. In both samples, the difference in
cycles for older and younger mayors is statistically significant at the 5% level. Columns
(5) and (6) test for an effect of the mayor’s age on capital expenditure, using a continuous
measure of age. Considering the results in both panels A and B, the point estimates
suggest that political cycles in capital expenditure are smaller for older mayors, and the
marginal effect of age is statistically significant at the 5% level in three out of four
specifications. The results suggest that increasing the mayor’s age by one year reduces the
size of the cycle in capital expenditure by 0.26–0.98 euros per capita. To compare the
results to the specification using a dichotomous measure of age, consider column (6) of
panel B. The average age of a younger mayor who wins the election is 43 years, while the
average age of an older mayor who wins the election is 55 years. Therefore the results
suggest that a typical younger mayor will increase capital expenditure before the election
by 9.66 euros per capita, while a typical older mayor will actually decrease capital
Economica
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expenditure before the election by 2.1 euros per capita. Therefore the specifications using
the dichotomous and continuous measures of age produce broadly similar results.
The baseline size and heterogeneity of political cycles in capital expenditure are both
larger in the sample of mayoral terms following close elections. Younger mayors with
career concerns are more likely to engage in political budget cycles in more politically
competitive municipalities where the stakes are higher. However, because political
competition is not randomly distributed across municipalities, and could be correlated
with other municipality characteristics, we cannot safely interpret this heterogeneous
effect as causal.
The results in columns (7)–(9) of Table 7 indicate that there is little evidence that
younger mayors engage in political cycles in current expenditure or that cycles in current
expenditure vary by the mayor’s age. This is consistent with Cioffi et al. (2012), who find
that budget cycles in Italian municipalities are driven by changes in capital expenditure.
This is because capital expenditure is highly visible, easily targeted to specific groups of
voters, and largely exempted from balanced-budget rules. All of the political-budget-
cycle results are very similar when we remove municipality-specific linear trends from the
revenue and expenditure outcomes. (See Table A7 in the Appendix for details.)
Is the relationship between the mayor’s age and political budget cycles non-linear?
Figure 4 plots point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients dk in
equation (5), where d‘ represents the difference between average political budget cycles for
mayors in bin ‘ and mayors in the 18–30 year bin, accounting for municipality fixed
effects, year effects, and the persistence of public finance outcomes. The first and third
graphs show that cycles in total revenue and current expenditure are similar across
different age bins. For these two outcomes, the size of the cycle for mayors aged 18–30 is
statistically indistinguishable from the size of the cycle for mayors in any of the older age
bins. In contrast, the second graph shows that cycles in capital expenditure are smaller for
mayors aged 46–50, 61–65 or over 66 compared to mayors aged 18–30, and this difference
is statistically significant. Focusing on the point estimates, we document four patterns.
First, increasing mayor age from the 18–30 bin to the 31–35 bin has virtually no effect on
capital expenditure cycles. Second, the marginal effect of mayor age on capital expenditure
cycles is negative moving from the 31–35 bin to the 36–40 bin. Third, the marginal effect
of age is roughly zero over the 36–60 age range. Finally, the marginal effect of age again
becomes negative for ages 61 and greater. Though one should avoid overinterpreting these
patterns in the face of substantial statistical uncertainty, they provide suggestive evidence
of non-linearities in the relationship between mayor age and cycles in capital expenditure.
The linear specification should therefore be interpreted as an approximation.
In Tables A8–A13 of the Appendix, we examine whether the effect of the mayor’s age
on political budget cycles varies according to the mayor’s wage, the presence of a
balanced-budget rule, or the electoral system. We exploit the fact that for Italian
municipalities, these three variables are each a step function of population, changing
discontinuously at different population thresholds.14 We find that the effect of age on
political budget cycles is smaller when the mayor’s wage is higher, the municipality is
subject to a balanced-budget rule, or the municipality uses runoff elections as opposed to
single-round plurality elections.15
Political budget cycles and re-election
Two of our main findings are that younger mayors increase investment spending right
before an election by a greater amount than older mayors, and younger mayors are more
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likely to be re-elected than older mayors. Do younger mayors have a higher probability
of re-election because they strategically increase spending right before the election, thus
fooling voters? This is a difficult question to answer because spending decisions are
endogenous and may be correlated with, among many other things, expectations of re-
election, which are unobservable. For instance, mayors who feel certain about their re-
election may be less prone to political budget cycles, and mayors who feel electorally
vulnerable may be more prone to cycles.
As shown in Table 8, in the sample of terms following close elections, there is a
positive correlation between the cycle in capital expenditure and re-election. This
correlation is statistically insignificant (but close to the 10% level) when mayor controls
and city and election-year effects are excluded; however, it becomes less precise when
either mayor controls or city and election-year effects are added to the regression. But it




















31–35 41–45 51–55 61–65 66+
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31–35 41–45 51–55 61–65 66+
Age Bin
Current expenditure per capita
FIGURE 4. Mayor age and political budget cycles. Notes: This figure plots point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals for the coefficients dk in the regression
Ym;t ¼ qYm;t1 þ aElecm;t þ
P8
k¼1 bk1ðAgem;t 2 BinkÞ þ
P8
k¼1 dkElecm;t  1ðAgem;t 2 BinkÞ þ gm þ ft þ mm;t.
The sample is restricted to years following ‘close’ elections decided by a vote margin of 5 percentage points or
fewer. The (omitted) reference age category is 18–30. Each included age bin is five years long, with the
exception of the final bin, which is aggregated to avoid very small bin sizes.
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the inclusion of the controls. While suggestive, these estimates may be biased and should
not be interpreted as causal. Mayors who strategically increase spending before the
election may exert more effort towards re-election in other dimensions, for instance in
political speeches, media appearances, and so on. Furthermore, spending decisions may
be correlated with expectations of re-election, which are unobservable.
In a previous version of this paper we have shown that the cycle in residual
expenditure (the difference between the promised and the delivered expenditures) is
correlated with re-election in a statistically significant way (the result is available on
request). This may be consistent with the view that voters may pay more attention to the
promises of politicians rather than to the implemented policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
We study the role of a politician’s age in determining their policy choices. We find that
younger politicians engage in political budget cycles on public investment more than
older ones. This result is consistent with a career-concerns model in which younger
politicians with a longer horizon in their career are more willing to engage in strategic
policies to ensure re-election. Interestingly, this is more likely to occur when elections are
close, and therefore even a small effect on voting behaviour could be critical. Younger
politicians are more likely to be re-elected, and there is suggestive evidence of a positive
correlation between re-election and political budget cycles, albeit statistically
insignificant.
TABLE 8
THE CORRELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND RE-ELECTION
Re-elected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Cycles in capital expenditure
D capital expenditure 0.00039 0.000090 0.0076 0.010
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0085) (0.0084)
Mayor controls No Yes No Yes
City and election-year effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.000 0.022 0.074 0.092
Municipalities 6581 6581 6581 6581
Observations 10,239 10,239 10,239 10,239
Panel B: Cycles in capital expenditure, close elections
D capital expenditure 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.035) (0.035)
Mayor controls No Yes No Yes
City and election-year effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.001 0.021 0.186 0.199
Municipalities 1902 1902 1902 1902
Observations 2123 2123 2123 2123
Notes See Table 6. The equations in columns (1) and (2) are estimated by OLS, and the equations in columns (3)
and (4) are estimated using municipality fixed effects and year-of-election effects. For the sake of readability, D
capital expenditure is measured in hundreds of euros per capita.
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN
One concern with the fixed-effects model is that time-varying unobservables may be correlated
with both the outcomes and the mayor’s age. For example, a change in voter preferences may
drive changes in outcomes and in the age of the winning mayoral candidate. Alternatively, the
age distribution of the mayoral candidate pool may change as a result of changes in policy
outcomes, if the candidate’s decision to run for office as a function of current policy differs by
age.
In order to address these concerns, we could use a regression discontinuity design and focus on
close elections between mayoral candidates of different ages. The running variable, X, would be
defined as the older candidate’s margin of victory, measured in percentage points. The main
intuition is that for each close election involving two candidates of different ages, whether the older
candidate wins would be as good as randomly assigned. Let D = 1 if the older candidate wins, and
D = 0 otherwise. Adopting the potential outcomes framework, let Yj denote the policy outcome in
the event that the winning politician is j years old, where j 2 {1,2,. . .,J}. In addition, let
AD 2 f1; 2; . . .; Jg be the age of the winning politician when the election outcome is D. The usual
monotonicity condition is satisfied, because by construction A1 > A0 for all elections.
Importantly, to apply this strategy, one would need to assume that E½YAD j X ¼ x is continuous at
x = 0 for D 2 {0,1}. The monotonicity and continuity conditions jointly suffice to identify the
causal effect of the politician’s age on policy outcomes (Hahn et al. 2001). In practice we would
estimate the equations
Amt ¼ aþ dDmt þ PðXmtÞ þ mmt;
Ymt ¼ cþ qAmt þ PðXmtÞ þ nmt;
using data from elections decided by a relatively narrow margin of victory.
Unfortunately, in our setting one of the assumptions required for identification is likely not










0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Propensity score: predicted probability that older candidate won
Younger candidate won Older candidate won
FIGURE A1. Density of estimated propensity scores. Notes: The graph plots the density of the estimated
propensity score for elections in which the younger candidate won and elections in which the older candidate
won. The propensity score for the older candidate winning is estimated using a logistic model and the
following covariates: prior appointment to city office, elected city political experience, unelected city political
experience, gender, high school education, college education, and born locally. Densities are estimating using
the standard Epanechnikov kernel and the subsample of elections determined by a margin of victory of 2
percentage points or fewer.
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provide supporting evidence is to show that a broad range of municipal and individual covariates
are balanced at the threshold. While the balancedness of municipal covariates is typically satisfied
in close elections, the strategy does not guarantee that individual covariates will be balanced, as
noted by Brollo and Troiano (2016). In Table A4 we verify that observable municipal
characteristics are indeed balanced in close elections (panel B), but we also show that many
individual covariates are not balanced (panel A).
We find that older mayors who win a close election are on average 11 years older than younger
mayors who win a close election. However, they differ on other dimensions as well. Older mayors
have more elected political experience, are less likely to be women, are more likely to be born in the
city where they become mayor, and are less educated. It should be noted that the continuity
TABLE A1
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES
Variable Definition and measure Sample Source
Age Age of the mayor, in years 1998–2013 IMI
Marg.of victory Margin of victory of older candidate, in percentage
points
1998–2013 IMI
Prior office Equal to 1 if mayor had prior appointment to any city
office
1998–2013 IMI
Exper.(elected) Mayor’s experience in elected city political office, in
years
1998–2013 IMI
Exper. (unelected) Mayor’s experience in unelected city political office, in
years
1998–2013 IMI
Woman Equal to 1 if the mayor is a woman 1998–2013 IMI
Born locally Equal to 1 if mayor was born in the city that he or she
governs
1998–2013 IMI
High school Equal to 1 if mayor has a high-school degree 1998–2013 IMI
College Equal to 1 if mayor has a college (bachelor’s) degree 1998–2013 IMI
Centre-right Equal to 1 if the mayor is a member of a centre-right
party
1998–2013 IMI
# Rivals Number of rival candidates 1998–2013 IMI
Term limited Equal to 1 if mayor has a binding term limit 1998–2013 IMI
Pop. Population 2001 Census
Pop. dens. Population density, measured as the number of people
per square kilometre
2005 SAIM
Prop. active pop. Proportion of population that is over 15 years old and
either has a job or is looking for one
2005 SAIM
Elderly Elderly index, equal to (population over 65 years old)/
(population under 14 years old)
2005 SAIM
Fam. size Average family size 2005 SAIM
Prod. p.c. Number of production units per capita 2005 SAIM
Employment Proportion of population that is employed 2005 SAIM
Income p.c. Disposable income per capita, in euros 2005 SAIM
Altitude Altitude of the city, in metres 2001 SAIM
North Equals 1 if municipality is in the north 2001 SAIM
Central Equals 1 if municipality is in the centre 2001 SAIM
South Equals 1 if municipality is in the south (includes Sicily
and Sardinia)
2001 SAIM
Notes IMI stands for Italian Ministry of the Interior. SAIM stands for Statistical Atlas of Italian Municipalities.
Census stands for the Italian census.
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TABLE A2
FURTHER VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES
Variable Definition and measure Sample Source
Ran again Incumbent mayor decided to run for office again (non-
term-limited mayors only)
1998–2013 IMI
Re-elected Incumbent mayor was re-elected (non-term-limited
mayors only)
1998–2013 IMI
Prov. admin. Mayor held a position in provincial administration
within 5 years of first mayoral mandate
1998–2014 IMI
Region. admin. Mayor held a position in regional administration within
5 years of first mayoral term
1998–2014 IMI
Nation. admin. Mayor held a position in national administration within
5 years of first mayoral term
1998–2014 IMI
Av. rev. Av. total collected revenue over the years of the mayor’s
term (€ per capita)
1998–2013 IMI
Av. cap. exp. Av. implemented capital expenditure over the years of
the mayor’s term (€ per capita)
1998–2013 IMI
Av. curr. exp. Av. implemented current expenditure over the years of
the mayor’s term (€ per capita)
1998–2013 IMI
D Revenue Total collected revenue in pre-election year minus
average revenue in previous years of term (€ per capita)
1998–2013 IMI
D Cap. exp. Implemented capital expenditure in pre-election year
minus av. capital expenditure in previous years of term
(€ p.c.)
1998–2013 IMI
D Curr. exp. Implemented current expenditure in pre-election year





Av. ratio of paid to committed current expenditure over
the years of the mayor’s term
1998–2013 IMI
House price Av. price of residential housing over term (€ per square
metre)
2002–2011 LRA
Notes IMI stands for Italian Ministry of the Interior. SAIM stands for Statistical Atlas of Italian Municipalities.
LRA stands for Italian Land Registry Agency. All budget variables exclude the election year.
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TABLE A3




candidate won Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mayor
Age 55.34 43.44 11.91*** 0.000
Previously held any city office 0.66 0.63 0.03 0.245
City political experience (elected) 5.17 4.18 0.99*** 0.000
City political experience (unelected) 0.62 0.70 0.08 0.450
Woman 0.11 0.15 0.04** 0.026
Born locally 0.52 0.39 0.13*** 0.000
High school degree 0.87 0.93 0.06*** 0.000
College degree 0.43 0.56 0.13*** 0.000
Centre-right party 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.873
Number of rivals on ballot 2.05 1.93 0.12* 0.089
Municipality
Population (2001) 6685.76 5453.53 1232.23 0.182
Population per square km (2005) 321.09 286.62 34.47 0.238
Active pop./total pop. (2005) 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.930
Elderly index (2005) 1.78 1.78 0.00 0.965
Family size (2005) 2.50 2.50 0.01 0.594
Production units per capita (2005) 0.08 0.07 0.00* 0.072
Employed/total pop. (2005) 0.27 0.25 0.02** 0.024
Income per capita (2005 €) 13,263.34 13,217.52 45.82 0.783
Altitude (metres) 455.06 482.74 27.68 0.230
North 0.52 0.50 0.02 0.390
Central 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.295
South 0.36 0.37 0.00 0.861
Observations 792 754
Notes The sample is restricted to non-term-limited mayoral terms following an election decided by a margin of 2
percentage points or fewer. Columns (1) and (2) report averages from elections decided by a margin of victory of
less than 2 percentage points. Column (3) reports the difference of the averages, and column (4) reports the p-
value corresponding to the two-sided test of equality of the averages. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05,
p < 0.01, respectively.
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TABLE A4








Panel A: Mayor characteristics
RD 11.2*** 0.042** 0.98*** 0.060 0.036*** 0.15***
(0.32) (0.017) (0.23) (0.074) (0.012) (0.019)
Bandwidth 15.4 14.6 11.6 12.1 15.3 14.2
Observations 10,789 10,371 8537 8814 10,766 10,123




RD 0.069*** 0.13*** 0.0042 0.0022 0.027
(0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.058) (0.018)
Bandwidth 12.7 13.3 14.3 9.94 10.4
Observations 9202 9571 10,159 7511 7829










RD 413.1 18.7 0.0013 0.057 0.012 0.00057
(1466.8) (24.4) (0.0028) (0.054) (0.012) (0.0010)
Bandwidth 11.5 13.4 8.39 12.6 12.4 11.5
Observations 8487 9603 6451 9137 9027 8448
Employment Income p.c. Altitude North Central South
RD 0.0063 96.2 34.2* 0.0045 0.0030 0.0098
(0.0086) (149.3) (19.5) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021)
Bandwidth 9.82 8.23 9.83 12.8 13.8 11.2
Observations 7440 6348 7441 9294 9903 8313
Notes See Tables A1 and A2 for variable definitions and data sources. The table gives sharp regression
discontinuity estimates using the older candidate’s margin of victory as the running variable. Estimates are
obtained by local linear regression using a uniform kernel and the Calonico et al. (2014) bandwidth selector.
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TABLE A5
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON AVERAGE BUDGET OUTCOMES (MUNICIPALITY-
SPECIFIC LINEAR TRENDS REMOVED)
Average revenue Average capital expend.
Average current
expend.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Fixed-effects estimates
Age 4.91 10.45 0.02 0.11 4.55 9.51
(8.53) (10.92) (0.44) (0.54) (7.59) (9.57)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 6581 6581 6581 6581 6581 6581
Observations 10,239 10,239 10,239 10,239 10,239 10,239
Panel B: Fixed-effects estimates, close elections
Age 3.99 4.49 0.20 0.18 4.73 5.79
(4.06) (4.57) (0.33) (0.36) (4.38) (4.93)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902
Observations 2123 2123 2123 2123 2123 2123
Notes See Table 3.
TABLE A6
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON HOUSE PRICES AND THE SPEED OF PUBLIC GOOD
PROVISION (MUNICIPALITY-SPECIFIC LINEAR TRENDS REMOVED)
Average house price Speed of public good provision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Fixed-effects estimates
Age 0.19 0.20 0.000035 0.000041
(0.18) (0.19) (0.000082) (0.000078)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 5232 5232 6581 6581
Observations 5995 5995 10,239 10,239
Panel B: Fixed-effects estimates, close elections
Age 0.71 0.23 0.000099 0.00026
(0.44) (0.49) (0.00052) (0.00032)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Municipalities 1173 1173 1902 1902
Observations 1228 1228 2123 2123
Notes See Table 6.
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TABLE A8
MAYOR AGE, POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND POPULATION THRESHOLDS FOR MAYOR







Yr pre 78.96*** 30.67*** 12.87**
(16.92) (6.74) (5.93)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [1K,3K) 68.02*** 23.92*** 19.08***
(19.26) (7.14) (6.62)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [3K,5K) 95.60*** 38.30*** 21.05***
(20.40) (7.42) (7.76)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [5K,10K) 86.36*** 29.37*** 20.63***
(20.16) (7.65) (6.95)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [10K,30K) 100.63*** 27.91*** 19.40**
(21.02) (7.55) (8.65)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 30K 75.45*** 33.82*** 20.15***
(21.06) (8.30) (7.26)
Old 123.94*** 23.95*** 58.52***
(17.75) (5.21) (8.67)
Old9 Pop. 2 [1K,3K) 147.42*** 25.74*** 69.90***
(20.72) (5.75) (10.06)
Old9 Pop. 2 [3K,5K) 160.00*** 29.91*** 70.56***
(24.35) (6.89) (11.61)
Old9 Pop. 2 [5K,10K) 172.16*** 33.04*** 81.85***
(25.57) (7.37) (12.31)
Old9 Pop. 2 [10K,30K) 169.18*** 35.04*** 82.38***
(26.24) (7.84) (12.64)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 30K 177.16*** 32.85*** 84.10***
(29.55) (8.32) (14.73)
Old9Yr pre 103.12*** 25.25*** 30.15***
(23.01) (9.66) (8.00)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [1K,3K) 116.82*** 16.21 41.46***
(26.29) (10.82) (9.16)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [3K,5K) 134.94*** 30.81*** 40.57***
(27.56) (11.14) (10.68)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [5K,10K) 120.54*** 27.32** 44.26***
(26.88) (10.77) (9.56)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [10K,30K) 121.69*** 24.20** 40.07***
(28.60) (10.99) (11.50)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 30K 131.70*** 40.76*** 46.87***
(36.07) (15.08) (12.10)
AR(2) test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001
7063 7063 7063
Observations 60,687 60,802 60,801
Notes All regressions include one lag of the dependent variable, account for municipality fixed effects and year
effects, and are estimated by system GMM. The results are from the sample for which the mayor is not term-
limited. ‘Yr pre’ is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the year before the election. The AR(2) test p-value
corresponds to a test of serial correlation in the error term. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust
to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the level of municipality. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01,
respectively.
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TABLE A9
MAYOR AGE, POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND POPULATION THRESHOLDS FOR MAYOR







Yr pre 127.17*** 54.99*** 24.43*
(42.79) (14.01) (14.10)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [1K,3K) 130.05*** 50.71*** 23.63
(43.95) (14.26) (14.97)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [3K,5K) 132.89*** 54.97*** 32.23**
(46.94) (14.89) (16.29)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [5K,10K) 138.78*** 57.71*** 28.14
(51.88) (15.18) (19.21)
Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [10K,30K) 166.09*** 49.45*** 37.70*
(53.23) (16.43) (21.22)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 30K 63.17 45.97** 7.64
(60.44) (18.32) (21.92)
Old 96.59* 24.97** 65.58***
(51.43) (9.96) (23.27)
Old9 Pop. 2 [1K,3K) 91.28* 22.71** 63.68***
(55.01) (10.34) (24.02)
Old9 Pop. 2 [3K,5K) 114.15* 28.97** 71.63***
(62.61) (11.71) (26.81)
Old9 Pop. 2 [5K,10K) 142.99** 35.41*** 90.35***
(66.47) (12.70) (30.72)
Old9 Pop. 2 [10K,30K) 126.00* 37.18** 83.76***
(68.97) (13.15) (30.53)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 30K 113.35* 31.42** 65.82***
(60.32) (13.81) (23.12)
Old9Yr pre 191.48*** 58.89*** 63.55***
(54.21) (17.65) (20.77)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [1K,3K) 211.52*** 54.55*** 65.90***
(59.23) (19.46) (22.25)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [3K,5K) 209.65*** 54.63*** 83.13***
(59.94) (20.55) (23.21)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [5K,10K) 221.97*** 66.94*** 77.39***
(62.12) (19.40) (25.51)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. 2 [10K,30K) 243.65*** 54.60*** 87.34***
(64.56) (20.32) (26.73)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 30K 142.74* 59.77** 43.46
(75.72) (23.20) (28.36)
AR(2) test p-value 0.196 0.449 0.243
Municipalities 2496 2498 2498
Observations 12,603 12,625 12,625
Notes All regressions include one lag of the dependent variable, account for municipality fixed effects and year
effects, and are estimated by system GMM. The results are from the sample for which the mayor is not term-
limited and the most recent election was decided by a vote margin of 5 percentage points or fewer. ‘Yr pre’ is an
indicator variable equal to 1 in the year before the election. The AR(2) test p-value corresponds to a test of serial
correlation in the error term. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the level of municipality. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
718 ECONOMICA [OCTOBER
Economica
© 2018 The London School of Economics and Political Science
TABLE A10








Yr pre 25.94*** 11.09*** 0.76
(7.39) (2.96) (2.62)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K 36.05 4.69 6.95
(42.22) (7.93) (21.01)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K9Yr ≥ 2001 0.71 5.56 1.12
(42.90) (7.23) (22.08)
Old 20.08*** 5.51*** 10.59***
(4.31) (1.58) (2.12)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 5K 82.27*** 13.42 50.60***
(29.15) (8.27) (14.79)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 5K9Yr ≥ 2001 19.55 1.86 19.03
(28.23) (7.77) (13.71)
Old9Yr pre 19.05** 10.97*** 2.05
(9.67) (4.00) (3.54)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K 0.65 7.87 5.99
(66.76) (13.90) (34.41)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K9Yr ≥ 2001 39.10 23.09* 8.58
(67.15) (13.38) (35.11)
AR(2) test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001
Municipalities 7063 7063 7063
Observations 60,687 60,802 60,801
Notes See Table A8.
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TABLE A11
MAYOR AGE, POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND THE BALANCED-BUDGET RULE (DYNAMIC







Yr pre 28.96* 16.06*** 4.78
(15.22) (5.26) (4.61)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K 57.74 5.19 29.42
(69.09) (10.32) (38.73)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K9Yr ≥ 2001 17.58 10.72 22.09
(66.58) (7.78) (38.36)
Old 20.38** 6.05* 14.80***
(9.97) (3.12) (5.51)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 5K 17.00 8.95 32.46*
(46.65) (15.59) (18.91)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 5K9Yr ≥ 2001 44.74 8.57 2.78
(44.64) (14.09) (17.74)
Old9Yr pre 32.46* 18.20*** 9.41
(18.26) (6.48) (6.59)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K 83.56 1.30 65.81
(80.98) (18.46) (41.93)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 5K9Yr ≥ 2001 22.40 25.02 46.88
(77.97) (16.51) (41.47)
AR(2) test p-value 0.193 0.441 0.273
Municipalities 2496 2498 2498
Observations 12,603 12,625 12,625
Notes See Table A9.
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TABLE A12
MAYOR AGE, POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND SINGLE-ROUND VS. RUNOFF ELECTIONS
(DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATES)
Revenue p.c. Capital expenditure p.c. Current expenditure p.c.
(1) (2) (3)
Yr pre 12.95 1.74 2.90
(12.19) (4.10) (9.11)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 15K 19.85 7.98* 9.50
(17.16) (4.73) (11.39)
Old 15.68* 3.69* 7.71
(8.62) (2.15) (6.29)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 15K 20.65 4.11 12.81
(13.10) (3.06) (9.34)
Old9Yr pre 5.99 7.43 3.35
(20.86) (7.28) (14.56)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 15K 31.68 2.83 12.99
(27.51) (8.67) (20.18)
AR(2) test p-value 0.078 0.438 0.781
Municipalities 857 857 857
Observations 7016 7022 7022
Notes All regressions include one lag of the dependent variable, account for municipality fixed effects and year
effects, and are estimated by system GMM. The results are from the sample for which the mayor is not term-
limited. The sample includes only municipalities with populations between 10,000 and 29,000 in order to hold
the mayor’s wage constant. ‘Yr pre’ is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the year before the election. The AR(2)
test p-value corresponds to a test of serial correlation in the error term. Standard errors, reported in parentheses,
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the level of municipality. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05,
p < 0.01, respectively.
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TABLE A13
MAYOR AGE, POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND SINGLE-ROUND VS. RUNOFF ELECTIONS
(DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATES, CLOSE ELECTIONS)
Revenue p.c. Capital expenditure p.c. Current expenditure p.c.
(1) (2) (3)
Yr pre 38.37 7.55 19.16
(26.40) (8.34) (25.41)
Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 15K 30.97 4.13 28.43
(32.37) (9.87) (25.98)
Old 15.76 3.55 0.25
(25.63) (5.35) (6.95)
Old9 Pop. ≥ 15K 23.85 6.67 2.55
(27.75) (5.16) (6.94)
Old9Yr pre 28.30 19.01 21.72
(35.69) (11.63) (28.92)
Old9Yr pre9 Pop. ≥ 15K 8.19 18.84 16.87
(42.64) (13.98) (28.26)
AR(2) test p-value 0.706 0.762 0.240
Municipalities 296 296 296
Observations 1341 1341 1341
Notes All regressions include one lag of the dependent variable, account for municipality fixed effects and year
effects, and are estimated by system GMM. The results are from the sample for which the mayor is not term-
limited and the most recent election was decided by a vote margin of 5 percentage points or fewer. The sample
includes only municipalities with populations between 10,000 and 29,000 in order to hold the mayor’s wage
constant. ‘Yr pre’ is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the year before the election. The AR(2) test p-value
corresponds to a test of serial correlation in the error term. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust
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assumption is not satisfied in this setting because age in our case is a ‘compounded treatment’ (age
being inherently correlated with other potential treatments at the individual level). In contrast, all
of the municipal characteristics are balanced in close elections, including population, geography,
income and demographic structure. The unbalancedness of individual covariates implies that we
cannot apply a standard regression discontinuity design in this setting. In a previous version of this
TABLE A15
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON AVERAGE BUDGET OUTCOMES (PROPENSITY-SCORE






IPW Match IPW Match IPW Match
ATE of Old 12.53 2.93 2.21 3.63 13.44 12.05
(26.79) (27.37) (5.82) (5.81) (13.57) (14.20)
Observations 859 859 859 859 859 859
Notes See Tables A1 and A2 for variable definitions and data sources. In all specifications, the sample is
restricted to mayoral terms in which the term limit is not binding. The table reports semiparametric estimates of
the average treatment effect (ATE) of the older candidate winning the election, using the subsample of elections
determined by a margin of victory of 2 percentage points or fewer. For each outcome, the first column reports
the inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment estimate (IPW), and the second column reports the
propensity-score matching estimate (Match). Both estimates utilize a propensity score estimated using a logistic
model and the following covariates: prior appointment to city office, elected city political experience, unelected
city political experience, gender, high school education, college education, and born locally. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors for the propensity-score matching estimates account for the first-stage estimation of the
propensity score and are calculated according to Abadie and Imbens (2016). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
TABLE A16
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON HOUSE PRICES AND THE SPEED OF PUBLIC GOOD
PROVISION (PROPENSITY-SCORE METHODS, IPW AND MATCHING ESTIMATES, CLOSE
ELECTIONS)
Average house price Speed of public good provision
IPW Match IPW Match
ATE of Old 57.3 68.7 0.0015 0.0019
(38.6) (45.5) (0.0047) (0.0049)
Observations 514 514 859 859
Notes See Table A15.
TABLE A17
THE EFFECT OF THE MAYOR’S AGE ON POLITICAL BUDGET OUTCOMES (PROPENSITY-SCORE
METHODS, IPW AND MATCHING ESTIMATES, CLOSE ELECTIONS)
D Revenue D Capital expend. D Current expend.
IPW Match IPW Match IPW Match
ATE of Old 3.82 0.18 11.41** 15.65** 1.15 1.86
(14.92) (16.23) (5.75) (6.13) (4.21) (4.41)
Observations 859 859 859 859 859 859
Notes See Table A15.
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paper we showed that our results are robust if we implement a regression discontinuity combined
with a matching strategy, to alleviate the concerns of unbalancedness, and following Keele and
Titiunik (2015); those results are available on request.
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NOTES
1. Under that law, the consulship could be held from age 42, the praetorship from age 39, and the curule
aedileship from age 36 (Kuiper 2010).
2. For instance, Cicero stated: ‘For it is in old men that reason and good judgment are found, and had it not
been for old men no state would have existed at all’ (Falconer 1923).
3. See Bisin et al. (2015), Prato (2018) and Alesina and Passarelli (2015) for theoretical models on the effects of
discount rates and time horizons on policies.
4. Factors that have been shown to matter for urban public finance include decentralization (Besley and Coate
2003), ethnic composition (Alesina et al. 2004) and geographical distribution (Ades and Glaeser 1995).
5. Casaburi and Troiano (2015) show that the political returns of implementing tax enforcement policies are
higher for mayors who are faster in providing public goods.
6. Repetto (2017) finds that a 2008 reform requiring all Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheets
before elections significantly reduced budget cycles in capital expenditure. Consistent with this result, we
find that the effect of the mayor’s age on capital expenditure cycles is strong prior to 2008 but non-existent
after the reform. (These results are available on request.)
7. The formalization of political business cycle models was pioneered by Nordhaus (1975), and subsequently
developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990).
8. Bordignon et al. (2016) study the effect of the electoral rules on policies, finding that under runoff elections,
the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is
smaller.
9. The electoral rule for city councillors also depends on the size of the municipality: in cities with fewer than
15,000 inhabitants, two-thirds of the seats are assigned to councillors in the mayoral coalition, while the rest
of the seats are assigned proportionally to the vote shares. In cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, if the
winning mayor’s coalition wins at least 60% of the vote in the first round, then every seat of the city council
is assigned according to the proportional rule. If the winning mayor’s coalition wins less than 60% but more
than 40% of the votes in the first round, then they are granted 60% of the seats, and the remaining seats are
assigned proportionally.
10. To be precise, we have data on election outcomes and mayor characteristics for 22,789 out of 25,950
elections (88%) held during the sample period.
11. Results obtained by difference GMM, which relies on weaker assumptions by exploiting the moment
conditions of only Arellano and Bond (1991), are very similar in terms of magnitude and statistical
significance.
12. The results are similar using much smaller or larger vote-margin thresholds, such as 2 or 10.
13. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a discussion of the career-concerns model.
14. The mayor’s wage increases at the following population thresholds: 1000, 3000, 5000, 10,000, 30,000, and
several higher thresholds that are relevant to only a tiny fraction of municipalities. (See Gagliarducci and
Nannicini (2013) for details.) A balanced-budget rule was introduced in 1999 and relaxed in 2001 only for
municipalities with populations below 5000. (See Grembi et al. (2016) for details.) Municipalities with
populations below 15,000 elect the mayor according to a single-round plurality system, while municipalities
with populations of 15,000 or greater elect the mayor according to a runoff system. (See Bordignon et al.
(2016) for details.)
15. The evidence is only suggestive because the size of the municipalities could influence the effect of age
on political budget cycles through many channels besides the wage, balanced-budget rule or electoral
system.
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